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Gertzman: Taxation: Extension
of Corn Products Doctrine to Section 1231 Dep
COMMENTS
TAXATION: EXTENSION OF CORN PRODUCTS DOCTRINE TO
SECTION 1231 DEPRECIABLE PROPERTY AND SECTION 337
LIQUIDATIONS
Hollywood BaseballAss'n v. Commissioner,423 F.2d
494 (9th Cir. 1970)
Petitioner, owner of a minor league baseball dub, sought to liquidate its
business pursuant to section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code., The Tax
Court2 denied the benefit of section 337 to the sale of depreciable player
contracts sold during liquidation on the ground that the contracts represented
"property held by the corporation primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of its trade or business." The court of appeals affirmed. 4
On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed and remanded 5 for reconsideration
in light of Afalat v. RiddellO where a similar property provision in section
1221 (1) was construed more narrowly than the Tax Court's interpretation
of section 337 (b) (1) (A) in the instant case. 7 On remand, the Tax Court
again found section 337 (b) (1) (A) applicable,8 relying on Malat and the
definitional modification of capital assets in Corn Products Refining Co. v.
Commissioner.9 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on petition for review
HELD, although the player contracts were not held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of petitioner's business, 0 the Tax Court
decision was correct since the Corn Products definitional change is applicable

1. INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, §337 [hereinafter cited as CODE]: "(a) GENERAL Rur. If
(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after June 22, 1954, and (2)
within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of such plan, all of the
assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet
claims, then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange
by it of property within such 12-month period."
2. Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 173, 196 (1964).
3. CODE §337 (b)(1): "IN GENERAL. For purposes of subsection (a), the term 'property'
does not include - (A) stock in trade of the corporation, or other property of a kind which
would properly be included in the inventory of the corporation if on hand at the close
of the taxable year, and property held by the corporation primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of its trade or business."
4. 352 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1965).
5. 383 U.S. 824 (1966).
6. 383 U.S. 569 (1965).
7. In Malat the Supreme Court construed the term "primarily" in §1221 to mean
"principally" or "of first importance," 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966), while the Tax Court in the
instant case construed the term "primarily" in §337 to mean "essential" or "substantial."
42 T.C. 173, 193 (1964).
8. 49 T.C. 388 (1968).
9. 350 U.S.46 (1955).
10. The court of appeals indicated that petitioner's primary purpose in holding the
players' contracts was to create income through ticket sales to baseball games. 423 F.2d 494,
495 (9th Cir. 1970).,
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not only to section 1221, but also to section 1231 depreciable property" and
2
section 337 liquidations. Judgment afrmed.
In Corn Products the taxpayer sought capital asset treatment for futures
transactions in the commodity market. These transactions were intended to
ensure the taxpayer an adequate supply of corn for use in its manufacturing
process. The court held that although the transactions were not within
explicit statutory exclusions to the definition of capital assets, they constituted
such an "integral" part of the taxpayer's manufacturing process that capital
asset treatment could not be allowed.'8 The court reasoned that permitting
capital asset treatment would defeat the congressional intent to limit preferential treatment provided by section 1221 to transactions in property that
are not the normal source of business income."
Few decisions have dealt with the applicability of the Corn Products doctrine to depreciable property. Although the majority of these cases have either
questioned the applicability of or reserved decision on the issue,' 5 support for
applying the doctrine may be inferred from Commissioner v. Gillette Motor
Transport, Inc.1 6 and United States v. Hess." In Gillette the Court stated
that the net effect of granting capital asset treatment to section 1231 depreciable property was to include depreciable property in the definition of
capital assets.' 8 Such property must therefore satisfy the same general criteria
governing the definition of capital assets.' 9 Gillette, however, is distinguishable
from the instant case since the question there was not whether property sold
should be treated as a capital asset but whether a forfeited right should be
20
classified as property.
In Hess the appellate court approved a jury instruction apparently based
on the Corn Products decision. The trial court instructed the jury that the
taxpayer's sales of depreciable property would generate ordinary income if
the sales were a substantial or essential part of the taxpayer's business. The

11. CODE §1231 (b) (1): "GENERAL RULE. The term 'property used in the trade or business' means property used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the
allowance for depreciation provided in section 167 .. "
12. 423 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 35, (1970).
13. 350 U.S. 46, 50 (1955). This statement represented a nonstatutory modification of the
definition of capital assets and will be referred to as "Corn Products doctrine" or the "integral"
test.

14. Id. at 52.
15. Hallcraft Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1964); Fishing Tools,
Inc. v. Usry, 232 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. La. 1964); Grant Oil Tool Co. v. United States, 381
F.2d 389 (Ct. Cl. 1967); E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904
(Ct. Cl. 1961).
16. 364 US. 130 (1960).
17. 341 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1965).
18. 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960). The Court felt the effect of §1231 was to remove §1221 (2)
depreciable property from the exclusions to the definition of capital assets.
19. Id.
20. As part of the war effort, the United States had deprived the taxpayer of the right

to freely determine what use was to be made of the company's property. Payment was made
to the taxpayer to compensate for the loss of that right.
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jury held for the taxpayer, and the appellate court refused to apply the
"integral" test of Corn Products as a matter of law.2
Prior to the instant case, only Deltide Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v.
United States22 directly confronted the applicability of the integral test to
depreciable property. Interpreting the test to be applicable only for determining whether a capital asset was involved, the court said that Congress,
by enacting section 1231, had determined that depreciable property was not
a capital asset. The court pointed out that although section 1231 extends
the preferential treatment afforded capital assets to depreciable noncapital
assets under certain circumstances, depreciable property is not defined as a
capital asset by the section. 23 The court added that merely because replacing
an investment is a recurring necessity, the taxpayer should not be deprived of
the right to replenish his investment at the preferred rate of taxation.24
In the instant case the court utilized a three-question approach to extend
application of the Corn Products doctrine. The first question was whether
the integral test applied to depreciable property.2 5 The court answered affirmatively since it made no difference whether property was defined as a capital
asset under section 1221 or treated as one under section 1231. Congressional
policy with respect to the two sections was interpreted as being the same:
to prevent preferential treatment to profits and losses arising from the everyday operation of the business.2 6
Although Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport,Inc.27 indicates that
similar treatment is to be accorded section 1221 and section 1231, the legislative history of the two sections clearly indicates a difference in congressional
policy. Section 1221 embodies a congressional desire to stimulate the free flow
of funds; such flow having been restricted by the fact that gains that had
accrued over a substantial period of time were taxed in a lump sum in the
year the profit was realized. 28 Congress, through section 1221, sought to
logically differentiate between the tax treatment accorded profits and losses

21.

United States v. Hess, 341 F.2d 444, 448 (10th Cir. 1965).

22. 279 F. Supp. 661 (E). La. 1968).
25. Id. at 655. CODE §1231 (a) provides: "(a) GEEmRL.Ru , If, during the taxable year,
the recognized gains on sales or exchanges of property used in the trade or business, plus the
recognized gains from the compulsory or involuntary conversion (as a result of destruction
in whole or in part, theft or seizure, or an exercise of the power of requisition or condemnation or the threat or imminence thereof) of property used in the trade or business and
capital assets held for more than 6 months into other property or money, exceed the recognized losses from such sales, exchanges, and conversions, such gains and losses shall be
considered as gains and losses from sale or exchange of capital assets held for more than 6
months. If such gains do not exceed such losses, such gains and losses shall not be considered
as gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets."
24. Deltide Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 661, 669 (ED.
Ia. 1968).
25. 425 F.2d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1970).
26. Id. at 498.
27. 64 U.S. 150 (1960).
28.

H.R. RE. No. 550, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921).
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arising from the everyday operation of a business and that accorded realized
29
appreciation in value over a period of time.
Such logical treatment has not, however, been a primary consideration

with section 1231.30 Depreciable property was originally included in the
definition of capital assets and thus accorded preferential capital gains treatment, 3' but during the 1930's a majority of taxpayers experienced losses and

depreciable property was excluded from capital asset treatment to allow the
entire loss to be deducted from ordinary income.3 2 When gains materialized
prior to World War II, Congress again granted capital asset preferential
treatment to depreciable property. 3 Such beneficial treatment continued until
1962 when it was limited by section 1245. 34 In 1964, section 1250 further
35
limited this preferential treatment.
Thus, while Congress intended, through section 1221 and its predecessors,
to differentiate logically between the profits and losses of everyday business
operations and those occasioned by a change in value over time, such considerations have not been the rule with respect to section 1231 depreciable
property. Congressional treatment of such property, rather than being con-

'sistent or logical, has been the result of practical considerations designed
to benefit the taxpayer. 36 Consequently, the court's reliance on congressional
policy appears unwarranted.
The second question posed was whether the Corn Products doctrine applied
to section 337.37 The court answered affirmatively but relied on three rather
tenuous reasons: the language of section 337 approximated that of sections
1221 and 1231; the rule that section 337 should be strictly construed; and
the Supreme Court's action in remanding the case indicated that the correlative provisions of section 1221 and section 337 could be similarly construed.3 8
The similar statutory language should not determine the applicability of
the Corn Products doctrine to section 337. Although courts have held the
legislative histories of sections 1221 and 1231 relevant in construing the
"primarily for sale" provision of section 337,9 nothing in the history of section
29. Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46,52 (1955).
30. See Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Transactions, 69 HARV. L. REV.
996-99 (1956).
31. Revenue Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, §206 (a) (6), 42 Stat. 227, 233.
32. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1938); Revenue Act of May 27, 1938,
ch. 289, §117 (a) (1), 52 Stat. 447.
33. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §151 (b), 56 Stat. 798. This enactment became §117
of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939.
34. §1245 provides that, in spite of §1231, any gains realized on a sale of certain
depreciable property will be recognized as ordinary income to the extent of the depreciation
allowed in 1962 and later years.
35. Section 1250 provides that ordinary income will be recognized on a sale of certain real
depreciable property to the extent of some part of any accelerated depreciation allowed after
1963.
86. Surrey, supra note 30, at 996, 997.
37. 423 F.2d 494, 499 (9th Cir. 1970).
38.' Id. at 500.
39. E.g., Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35, 45 (4th Cir. 1965); Jeanese, Inc.
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387 indicates a congressional intent to apply a nonstatutory exception to the
definition of capital assets (the Corn Products doctrine) to section 337.40
Section 337 deals only with property and makes no reference to "capital
1

assets."4
Although there is authority that section 337 should be strictly construed,'4
it does not necessarily follow that a rule of statutory construction permits a
nonstatutory exception. In Rommer v. United States43 the court stated that
nothing in section 337 or its legislative history indicated a congressional
intent to impose any conditions upon a corporation seeking to come within
4
section 337 except those conditions and dearly expressed in the section. "
The court's third reason for applying the Corn Products doctrine to section
337 is equally suspect. The Supreme Court remanded the case because the
Tax Court construed the "primarily" of section 337 (b) (1) (A) differently
from the "primarily" of section 1221 as construed in Malat v. Riddel.45 The
court in the instant case admitted the Corn Products doctrine is not related
to the term "primarily for sale."' 4 Thus, the action of the Supreme Court,
in remanding on a matter unrelated to the Corn Products doctrine, does not
support the extension of the doctrine to section 337.
The last question asked by the court was whether the requirements of
Corn Products were met in the instant case. 47 The only requirement discussed
by the court was proof that the activities in question were integral-carried
on to protect or to allow the function of the taxpayer's true business.48 If the
transaction served the function of preserving depreciable property, the court
49
felt that Corn Productsshould apply.
Such a definition of "integral" is sufficiently broad to apply the Corn
Products doctrine to almost any transaction by a taxpayer to continue his
business. The taxpayer in the instant case challenged the definition by citing
several cases where the sale of depreciable property, which was an essential
and necessary aspect of the business, has been afforded capital gains treatment.50 The court of appeals distinguished these cases from the instant case
v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 304, 309 (NJD. Cal. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 341 F.2d
502 (9th Cir. 1965).
40. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); 3 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. Naws 4621,
4896, 4897 (1954). The congressional purpose behind §337 was to provide uniform tax treatment in liquidating corporations whether the assets were sold by the corporation or by
the stockholders.
41.

CoD

§337.

42. Whitson v. Rockwood, 190 F. Supp. 478, 481 (D.N.D. 1960).
43. 268 F. Supp. 740 (D.N.J. 1966).
44. Id. at 745.
45. 383 U.S. 569 (1966). There is a presumption that words appearing in different
sections of the same act are to be given the same meaning. Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286
US. 427, 433 (1932). See note 7 supra.
46. 423 F.2d 494,499 (9th Cir. 1970).
47. Id. at 500.
48. Id. at 502.
49. Id.
50. E.g., Hillard v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1960); Philber Equip. Corp. v.
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on the ground that the cited cases involved the sale or replacement of equipment no longer usable in the business. The sale thus constituted the last phase
of a cycle in the use of capital goods. The court felt, however, that the player
contracts sold in the instant case were generally the contracts of the more
valuable players. They were neither obsolete, old, nor damaged and they were
not in the final stage of their utility.51

This distinction seems to be an attempt by the court to rationalize its
extension of the Corn Products doctrine in the instant case. If the court
intended to limit its extension to cases where the depreciable property had
not become obsolete, old, or damaged, then the court was inconsistent in
holding, without qualification, that Corn Products applied to section 1231
depreciable property.
The court in the instant case applied the rationale behind the integral test
of Corn Products to section 1231 depreciable property and section 337 liquidations to deny the taxpayer the preferential treatment provided. Its reasons
were predicated upon a questionable interpretation of congressional policy,
an unwarranted reliance on the similarity of the statutory language involved,
and a definition of "integral" so broad that it could include almost any transaction. Hopefully, courts in the future will not rely on the Corn Products
doctrine, but offer more logical arguments to justify decisions involving
similar issues.
STEPHEN F. GERTZMAN

Commissioner, 237 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1956). In both cases the court held that sales of vehicles
made by vehicle leasing firms should be allowed capital gains treatment. The dissent in
Hillard based on Corn Products would have denied capital gains treatment. 281 F.2d 279,

284 (5th Cir. 1960).
51.

423 F.2d 494, 503 (9th Cir. 1970). It should be noted that the Internal Revenue

Service has ruled the sales of player contracts held by major league clubs will be given
§1231 (a) treatment. Rev. RuL 67-380, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 291.
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